Brief Description

Students are expected to read and critically assess an article assigned by the instructor.  Read, reread, and consider the ideas advanced by the author.  Do you agree?  Disagree?  Are the ideas presented relevant today?  What are the strengths and weaknesses of the arguments?  The goal of this assignment is for you to critically assess the ideas advanced by the author using your own knowledge and experience to justify your position.

Submission Instructions

The critique should be a maximum of 2 pages, double spaced, 12pt font and follow APA formatting. he critique should include an introductory paragraph briefly summarizing the article and a concluding paragraph briefly summarizing the student’s position on the value/accuracy/relevance of the article. This assignment should draw on materials from the assigned readings and discussion materials, in addition to external materials, your past learnings, and your experiences. Remember – this is based on YOUR assessment of the article not someone else’s opinion.

Brief Description Students are expected to read and critically assess an article assigned by the instructor.  Read, reread, and consider the ideas advanced by the author.  Do you agree?  Disagree?  Ar
BEST i960 We always know when an HBR article hits the big time. Journalists write about it, pundits talk about it, executives routecopiesof it around the organization, and its vocabulary becomes familiar to managers everywhere -sometimes to the point where they don’t even associate the words with the original article. Most important, of course, managers change how they do business because the ideas in the piece helped them see issues in a new light. “Marketing Myopia” is the quintessential big hit HBR piece. In it,Theodore Levitt, who was then a lecturer in business administration at the Harvard Busi- ness School, introduced the famous question,”What business are you really in?” and with ittheclaim that, had railroad executives seen themselves as being in the transportation business rather than the railroad business, they would have continued to grow. The article is as much about strategy as it is about market- ing, but it also introduced the most influential marketing idea of the past half- century: that businesses wilt do better in the end if they concentrate on meeting customers’needs rather than on selling products. “Marketing Myopia” won the McKinsey Award in i960. Marketing Myopia by Theodore Levitt Sustained growth depends on how broadly you define your business-and how carefully you gauge your customers’needs. E VERY MAJOR INDUSTRY WaS a growth industry. But some that are now riding a wave of growth en- thusiasm are very much in the shadow of decline. Others that are thought of as seasoned growth industries have actu- ally stopped growing. In every case, the reason growth is threatened, slowed, or stopped is not because the market is saturated. It is because there has been a failure of management. Fateful Purposes The failure is at the top. The executives responsible for it, in the last analysis, are those who deal with broad aims and policies. Thus: • The railroads did not stop growing because the need for passenger and freight transportation declined. That grew. The railroads are in trouble today not because that need was filled by others (cars, trucks, airplanes, and even telephones) but because it was not filled by the railroads themselves. They let others take customers away from them because they assumed themselves to be in the railroad business rather than in tbe transportation business. The reason they defined their industry incorrectly was that they were railroad oriented instead of transportation oriented; they were product oriented instead of cus- tomer oriented. • Hollywood barely escaped being to- tally ravished by television. Actually, all the established film companies went through drastic reorganizations. Some 138 HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW simply disappeared. All of them got into trouble not because of TV’s inroads but because of their own myopia. As with the railroads, Hollywood defined its business incorrectly. It thought it was in the movie business when It was ac- tually in the entertainment business. “Movies” implied a specific, limited product. This produced a fatuous contentment that from the beginning led pro- ducers to view TV as a threat. Hollywood scorned and re- jected TV when it should have welcomed it as an opportu- nity-an opportunity to expand the entertainment business. Today, TV is a bigger busi- ness than the old narrowly defined movie business ever was. Had Hollywood been cus- tomer oriented (providing en- tertainment) rather than prod- uct oriented (making movies), would it have gone through the fiscal purgatory that it did? 1 doubt it. What ulti- mately saved Hollywood and accounted for its resurgence was the wave of new young writers, producers, and direc- tors whose previous successes in television had decimated the old movie companies and toppled the big movie moguls. There are other, less obvious examples of industries that have been and are now endangering their futures by improperly defining their purposes. I shall discuss some of them in detail later and analyze the kind of policies that lead to trouble. Right now, it may help to show what a thoroughly customer- oriented management can do to keep a growth industry growing, even after the obvious opportunities have been exhausted, and here there are two ex- amples that have been around for a long time. They are nylon and glass-specifi- cally, E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Com- pany and Corning Glass Works. Both companies have great technical competence. Their product orientation is unquestioned. But this alone does not explain their success. After all, who was more pridefully product oriented and product conscious than the erstwhile New England textile companies that have been so thoroughly massacred? The DuPonts and the Comings have succeeded not primarily because of their product or research orientation but because they have been thoroughly customer oriented also. It is constant watchfulness for opportunities to apply their technical know-how to the cre- ation of customer-satisfying uses that accounts for their prodigious output of successful new products. Without a very sophisticated eye on the customer, most of their new products might have been wrong, their sales methods useless. Aluminum has also continued to be a growth industry, thanks to the efforts of two wartime-created companies that deliberately set about inventing new customer-satisfying uses. Without Kai- ser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation and Reynolds Metals Company.the total demand for aluminum today would be vastly less. Error of Analysis. Some may argue that it is foolish to set the railroads off against aluminum or the movies off against glass. Are not aluminum and glass naturally so versatile that the in- dustries are bound to have more growth opportunities than the railroads and the movies? This view commits precisely the error I have been talking about. It defines an in- dustry or a product or a cluster of know-how so narrowly as to guarantee its premature senes- cence. When we mention “rail- roads,” we should make sure we mean “transportation.” As transporters, the railroads still have a good chance for very considerable growth. They are not limited to the railroad busi- ness as such (though in my opinion, rail transportation is potentially a much stronger transportation medium than is generally believed). What the railroads lack is not opportunity but some of the managerial imaginative- ness and audacity that made them great. Even an amateur like Jacques Barzun can see what is lacking when he says, “I grieve to see the most ad- vanced physical and social or- ganization of the last century go down in shabby disgrace for lack ofthe same comprehensive imagi- nation that built it up. [What is lacking is] the will of the companies to survive and to satisfy the public by inventive- ness and skill.”‘ Shadow of Obsolescence It is impossible to mention a single major industry that did not at one time qualify for the magic appellation of “growth industry.” In each case, the in- dustry’s assumed strength lay in the ap- parently unchallenged superiority of its product There appeared to be no effec- tive substitute for it. It was itself a run- away substitute for the product it so triumphantly replaced. Yet one after another of these celebrated industries has come under a shadow. Let us look TOP-LINE GROWTH |ULY-AUGUST 2OO4 139 BEST OF HBR • Marketing Myopia briefly at a few more of them, this time taking examples that have so far received a little less attention. Dry Cleaning. This was once a growth industry with lavish prospects. In an age of wool garments, imagine being finally able to get them clean safely and eas- ily. The boom was on. Yet here we are 30 years after the boom started, and the industry is in trouble. Where has the competition come from? From a better way of cleaning? No. It has come from synthetic fibers and chemical additives that have cut the need for dry cleaning. But this is only the beginning. Lurking in the wings and ready to make chemi- cal dry cleaning totally obsolete is that powerful magician, ultrasonics. Electric Utilities. This is another one of those supposedly “no substitute” products that has been enthroned on a pedestal of invincible growth. When the incandescent lamp came along, ker- osene lights were finished. Later, the waterwheel and the steam engine were cut to ribbons by the flexibility, reliabil- ity, simplicity, and just plain easy avail- ability of electric motors. The prosperity of electric utilities continues to wax ex- travagant as the home is converted into a museum of electric gadgetry. How can anybody miss by investing in utili- ties, with no competition, nothing but growth ahead? But a second look is not quite so com- forting. A score of nonutility compa- nies are well advanced toward develop- ing a powerful chemical fuel cell, which could sit in some hidden closet of every home silently ticking off electric power. The electric lines that vulgarize so many neighborhoods would be eliminated. So would the endless demolition of streets and service interruptions during storms. Also on the horizon is solar energy, again pioneered by nonutility companies. Who says that the utilities have no competition? They may be natural mo- Theodore Levitt, a longtime professor of marketing at Harvard Business School In Boston, is now professor emeritus. His most recent books are Thinking About Man- agement (1(^90) and The Marketing Imag- ination (1983), both from Free Press. nopolies now, but tomorrow they may be natural deaths. To avoid this pros- pect, they too will have to develop fuel cells, solar energy, and other power sources.Tosurvive,they themselves will have to plot the obsolescence of what now produces their livelihood. Grocery Stores. Many people find it hard to realize that there ever was a thriving establishment known as the “corner store.” The supermarket took over with a powerful effectiveness. Yet the big food chains of the ig3os nar- rowly escaped being completely wiped out by the aggressive expansion of in- dependent supermarkets. The first gen- uine supermarket was opened in 1930, in Jamaica, Long Island. By 1933, super- markets were thriving in California, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and elsewhere. Yet the established chains pompously ig- nored them. When they chose to notice them, it was with such derisive descrip- tions as “cheapy,” “horse-and-buggy,” “cracker-barrel storekeeping” and “un- ethical opportunists.” The executive of one big chain an- nounced at the time that he found it “hard to believe that people will drive for miles to shop for foods and sacrifice the personal service chains have per- fected and to which [the consumer] is accustomed.”‘ As late as 1936, the Na- tional Wholesale Grocers convention and the New Jersey Retail Grocers As- sociation said there was nothing to fear. They said that the supers’ narrow ap- peal to the price buyer limited the size of their market. They had to draw from miles around. When imitators came, there would be wholesale liquidations as volume fell. The high sales of the supers were said to be partly due to their novelty. People wanted convenient neighborhood grocers. If the neighbor- hood stores would “cooperate with their suppliers, pay attention to their costs, and improve their service,” they would be able to weather the competition until it blew over.’ It never blew over. The chains discov- ered that survival required going into the supermarket business. This meant the wholesale destruction of their huge investments in corner store sites and in established distribution and merchan- dising methods. The companies with “the courage of their convictions” reso- lutely stuck to the corner store philoso- phy. They kept their pride but lost their shirts. A Self-Deceiving Cycle. But memo- ries are short. For example, it is hard for people who today confidently hail the twin messiahs of electronics and chem- icals to see how things could possibly go wrong with these galloping indus- tries. They probably also cannot see how a reasonably sensible businessperson could have been as myopic as the fa- mous Boston millionaire who early in the twentieth century unintentionally sentenced his heirs to poverty by stipu- lating that his entire estate be forever invested exclusively in electric streetcar securities. His posthumous declaration, “There will always be a big demand for efficient urban transportation,” is no consolation to his heirs, who sustain life by pumping gasoline at automobile fill- ing stations. Yet, in a casual survey I took among a group of intelligent business execu- tives, nearly half agreed that it would be hard to hurt their heirs by tying their estates forever to the electronics industry. When I then confronted them with the Boston streetcar example, they chorused unanimously, “That’s differ- ent!” But is it? Is not the basic situation identical? In truth, there is no such thing as a growth industry, I believe.There are only companies organized and operated to create and capitalize on growth oppor- tunities. Industries that assume them- selves to be riding some automatic growth escalator invariably descend into stagnation. The history of every dead and dying”growth”industry shows a self-deceiving cycle of bountiful ex- pansion and undetected decay. There are four conditions that usually guar- antee this cycle: 1. The belief that growth is assured by an expanding and more affluent population; 2. The belief that there is no compet- itive substitute forthe industry’s major product; 140 HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW Marketing Myopia • BEST OF HBR 3. Too much faith in mass production and in the advantages of rapidly declin- ing unit costs as output rises; 4. Preoccupation with a product that lends itself to carefully controlled sci- entific experimentation, improvement, and manufacturing cost reduction. I should like now to examine each of these conditions in some detail. To build my case as boldly as possible, I shall illustrate the points with reference to three industries: petroleum, automo- biles, and electronics. I’ll focus on pe- troleum in particular, because it spans more years and more vicissitudes. Not only do these three industries have excellent reputations with the general public and also enjoy the confidence of sophisticated investors, but their man- agements have become known for pro- gressive thinking in areas like financial control, product research, and manage- ment training. If obsolescence can crip- ple even these industries, it can happen anywhere. Population Myth The belief that profits are assured by an expanding and more affluent popula- tion is dear to the heart of every indus- try. It takes the edge off the apprehen- sions everybody understandably feels about the future. If consumers are mul- tiplying and also buying more of your product or service, you can face the fu- ture with considerably more comfort than if the market were shrinking. An expanding market keeps the manufac- turer from having to think very hard or imaginatively. If thinking is an intel- lectual response to a problem, then the absence of a problem leads to the ab- sence of thinking. If your product has an automatically expanding market, then you will not give much thought to how to expand it. One of the most interesting exam- ples of this is provided by the petroleum industry. Probably our oldest growth in- dustry, it has an enviable record. While there are some current concerns about its growth rate, the industry itself tends to be optimistic. But 1 believe it can be demonstrated that it is undergoing a fundamental yet typical change. It is not only ceasing to be a growth industry but may actually be a declining one, relative to other busi- nesses. Although there is widespread un- awareness of this fact, it is conceivable that in time, the oil industry may find itself in much the same position of ret- rospective glory that the railroads are now in. Despite its pioneering work in developing and applying the present- value method of investment evaluation, in employee relations, and in working with developing countries, the petro- leum business is a distressing example of how complacency and wrongheaded- ness can stubbornly convert opportu- nity into near disaster. One of the characteristics of this and other industries that have believed very strongly in the beneficial consequences of an expanding population, while at the same time having a generic product for which there has appeared to be no com- petitive substitute, is that the individual companies have sought to outdo their competitors by improving on what they are already doing. This makes sense, of course, if one assumes that sales are tied to the country’s population strings, be- cause the customer can compare prod- ucts only on a feature-by-feature basis. I believe it is significant, for example, that not since John D. Rockefeller sent free kerosene lamps to China has the oil industry done anything really out- standing to create a demand for its prod- uct. Not even in product improvement has it showered itself with eminence. The greatest single improvement-the development of tetraethyl lead-came from outside the industry, specifically from General Motors and DuPont. The big contributions made by the industry itself are confined to the technology of TOP-LINE GROWTH J ULY-AUGUST 2OO4 141 BEST OF HBR • Marketing Myopia oil exploration, oil production, and oil refining. Asking for Trouble. In other words, the petroleum industry’s efforts have fo- cused on improving the efficiency of get- ting and making its product, not really on improving the generic product or its marketing. Moreover, its chief product bas continually been defined in the nar- rowest possible terms – namely, gaso- line, not energy, fuel, or transportation. This attitude has helped assure that: • Major improvements in gasoline quality tend not to originate in the oil in- dustry. The development of superior al- ternative fuels also comes from outside the oil industry, as will be shown later. • Major innovations in automobile fuel marketing come from small, new oil companies that are not primarily pre- occupied with production or refining. These are the companies that have been responsible for the rapidly expanding muttipump gasoline stations, with their successful emphasis on large and clean layouts, rapid and efficient driveway ser- vice, and quality gasoline at low prices. Thus, the oil industry is asking for trouble from outsiders. Sooner or later, in this land of hungry investors and en- trepreneurs, a threat is sure to come. The possibility of this will become more These have value only if there is a mar- ket for products into which oil can be converted. Hence the tenacious belief in the continuing competitive superi- ority of automobile fuels made from crude oil. This idea persists despite all historic evidence against it. The evidence not only shows that oil has never been a su- perior product for any purpose for very long but also that the oil industry has never really been a growth industry. Rather, it has been a succession of differ- ent businesses that have gone through the usual historic cycles of growth, matu- rity, and decay. The industry’s overall survival is owed to a series of miraculous escapes from total obsolescence, of last- minute and unexpected reprieves from total disaster reminiscent of the perils of Pauline. The Perils of Petroleum. To illus- trate, I shall sketch in only the main episodes. First, crude oil was largely a patent medicine. But even before that fad ran out, demand was greatly ex- panded by the use of oil in kerosene lamps. The prospect of lighting the world’s lamps gave rise to an extrava- gant promise of growth. The prospects were similar to those the industry now holds for gasoline in other parts of the It is hard for people who hail the twin messiahs of electronics and chemicals to see how things could possibly go wrong with these galloping industries. apparent when we tum to the next dan- gerous belief of many managements. For the sake of continuity, because this second belief is tied closely to the first, I shall continue with the same example. The Idea of Indispensability. The petroleum industry is pretty much con- vinced that there is no competitive sub- stitute for its major product, gasoline – or, if there is, that it will continue to be a derivative of crude oil, such as diesel fuel or kerosene jet fuel. There is a lot of automatic wishful thinking in this assumption. The trou- ble is that most retining companies own huge amounts of crude oil reserves. world. It can hardly wait for the under- developed nations to get a car in every garage. In the days of the kerosene lamp, the oil companies competed with each other and against gaslight by trying to im- prove the illuminating characteristics of kerosene. Then suddenly the impos- sible happened. Edison invented a light that was totally nondependent on crude oil. Had it not been for the growing use of kerosene in space heaters, the incan- descent lamp would have completely finished oil as a growth industry at that time. Oil would have been good for lit- tle else than axle grease. Then disaster and reprieve struck again. TVvo great innovations occurred, neither originating in the oil industry. First, the successful development of coal- burning domestic central-heating sys- tems made the space heater obsolete. While the industry reeled, along came its most magnificent boost yet: the in- temal combustion engine, also invented by outsiders. Then, when the prodigious expansion for gasoline finally began to level off in the 1920s, along came the mi- raculous escape of the central oil heater. Once again, the escape was provided by an outsider’s invention and develop- ment. And when that market weakened, wartime demand for aviation fuel came to the rescue. After the war, the expan- sion of civilian aviation, the dieselization of railroads, and the explosive demand for cars and trucks kept the industry’s growth in high gear. Meanwhile, centralized oil heating- whose boom potential had only recently been proclaimed-ran into severe com- petition from natural gas. While the oil companies themselves owned the gas that now competed with their oil, the industry did not originate the natural gas revolution, nor has it to this day greatly profited from its gas ownership. The gas revolution was made by newly formed transmission companies that marketed the product with an aggres- sive ardor. They started a magnificent new industry, first against the advice and then against tbe resistance of the oil companies. By all the logic of the situation, the oil companies themselves should have made the gas revolution. They not only owned the gas, they also were the only people experienced in handling, scrub- bing, and using it and the only people experienced in pipeline technology and transmission. They also understood heat- ing problems. But, partly because they knew that natural gas would compete with their own sale of heating oil, the oil companies pooh-poohed the potential of gas. The revolution was finally started by oil pipeline executives who, unable to persuade their own companies to go into gas, quit and organized the spectacularly successful gas transmission companies. 142 UARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW Marketing Myopia • BEST OF HBR Even after their success became pain- fully evident to the oil companies, the latter did not go into gas transmission. The multibillion-doilar business that should have been theirs went to others. As in the past, the industry was blinded by its narrow preoccupation with a spe- cific product and the value of its reserves. It paid little or no attention to its custom- ers’basic needs and preferences. The postwar years have not witnessed any change. Immediately after World War II, the oil industry was greatly en- couraged about its future by the rapid increase in demand for its traditional line of products. In 1950, most compa- nies projected annual rates of domestic expansion of around 6% through at least 1975- Though the ratio of crude oil re- serves to demand in the free world was about 20 to 1, with lo to 1 being usually considered a reasonable working ratio in the United States, booming demand sent oil explorers searching for more without sufficient regard to what the future really promised. In 1952, they “hit” in the Middle East; the ratio sky- rocketed to 42 to 1. If gross additions to reserves continue at the average rate of the past five years (37 billion barrels an- nually), then by 1970, the reserve ratio will be up to 45 to 1. This abundance of oil has weakened crude and product prices all over the world. An Uncertain Future. Management cannot find much consolation today in the rapidly expanding petrochemical in- dustry, another oil-using idea that did not originate in the leading firms. The total U.S. production of petrochemicals is equivalent to about 2% (by volume) of the demand for all petroleum prod- ucts. Although the petrochemical in- dustry is now expected to grow by about 10% per year, this will not offset other drains on the growth of crude oil con- sumption. Furthermore, while petro- chemical products are many and grow- ing, it is important to remember that there are nonpetroleum sources of the basic raw material, such as coal. Besides, a lot of plastics can be produced with relatively little oil. A 50,000-barrel-per- day oil refinery is now considered the absolute minimum size for efficiency. But a 5,000-barrel-per-day chemical plant is a giant operation. Oil has never been a continuously strong growth industry. It has grown by fits and starts, always miraculously saved by innovations and developments not of its own making. The reason it has not grown in a smooth progression is that each time it thought it had a superior product safe from the possibility of com- petitive substitutes, the product turned out to be inferior and notoriously sub- ject to obsolescence. Until now, gasoline ecration of the countryside with adver- tising signs, and other wasteful and vul- gar practices. Galbraith has a finger on something real, but he misses the stra- tegic point. Mass production does in- deed generate great pressure to “move” the product. But what usually gets em- phasized is selling, not marketing. Mar- keting, a more sophisticated and com- plex process, gets ignored. The difference between marketing and selling is more than semantic. Sell- ing focuses on the needs of the seller, The history of every dead and dying “growth” industry shows a self-deceiving cycle of bountiful expansion and undetected decay. (for motor fuel, anyhow) has escaped this fate. But, as we shall see later, it too may be on its last legs. The point of all this is that there is no guarantee against product obsoles- cence. If a company’s own research does not make a product obsolete, another’s will. Unless an industry is especially lucky, as oil has been until now, it can easily go down in a sea of red figures- just as the railroads have, as the buggy whip manufacturers have, as the comer grocery chains have, as most of the big movie companies have, and, indeed, as many other industries have. The best way for a firm to be lucky is to make its own luck. That requires knowing what makes a business suc- cessful. One of the greatest enemies of this knowledge is mass production. Production Pressures Mass production industries are impelled by a great drive to produce all they can. The prospect of steeply declining unit costs as output rises is more than most companies can usually resist. The profit possibilities look spectacular. All effort focuses on production. The result is that marketing gets neglected. John Kenneth Galbraith contends that just the opposite occurs.” Output is so prodigious that all effort concentrates on trying to get rid of it. He says this ac- counts for singing commercials, the des- marketing on the needs of the buyer. Selling is preoccupied with the seller’s need to convert the product into cash, marketing with the idea of satisfying the needs of the customer by means of the product and the whole cluster of things associated with creating, deliver- ing, and, finally, consuming it. In some industries, the enticements of full mass production have been so pow- erful that top management in effect has told the sales department, “You get rid of it; we’ll worry about profits.” By con- trast, a truly marketing-minded firm tries to create value-satisfying goods and services that consumers will want to buy. What it offers for sale includes not only the generic product or service but also how it is made available to the cus- tomer, in what form, when, under what conditions, and at what terms of trade. Most important, what it offers for sale is determined not by the seller but by the buyer. The seller takes cues from the buyer in such a way that the product be- comes a consequence of the marketing effort, not vice versa. A Lag in Detroit. This may sound like an elementary rule of business, but that does not keep it from being vio- lated wholesale. It is certainly more vi- olated than honored. Take the automo- bile industry. Here mass production is most famous, most honored, and has the greatest TOP-LINE GROWTH JULY-AUGUST 2004 143 BEST OF HBR • Marketing Myopia impact on the entire society. The indus- try has hitched its fortune to the relent- less requirements of the annual model change, a policy that makes customer orientation an especially urgent neces- sity. Consequently, the auto companies annually spend millions of dollars on consumer research. But the fact that the new compact cars are selling so well in their first year indicates that Detroit’s vast researches have for a long time secondary importance. That is under- scored by the fact that the retailing and servicing ends of this industry are nei- ther owned and operated nor controlled by the manufacturers. Once the car is produced, things are pretty much in the dealer’s inadequate hands. Illustrative of Detroit’s arms-length attitude is the fact that, while servicing holds enor- mous sales-stimulating, profit-building opportunities, only 57 of Chevrolet’s If thinking is an intellectual response to a problem, then the absence of a problem leads to the absence of thinking. failed to reveal what customers really wanted. Detroit was not convinced that people wanted anything different from what they had been getting until it lost millions of customers to other small-car manufacturers. How could this unbelievable lag be- hind consumer wants have been per- petuated for so long? Why did not re- search reveal consumer preferences before consumers’ buying decisions themselves revealed the facts? Is that not what consumer research is for-to find out before the fact what is going to happen? The answer is that Detroit never really researched customers’wants. It only researched their preferences be- tween the kinds of things it had already decided to offer them. For Detroit is mainly product oriented, not customer oriented. To the extent that the cus- tomer is recognized as having needs that the manufacturer should try to sat- isfy, Detroit usually acts as if the job can be done entirely by product changes. Occasionally, attention gets paid to fi- nancing, too, but that is done more in order to sell than to enable the cus- tomer to buy. As for taking care of other customer needs, there is not enough being done to write about. The

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